15 August, the shift of prison resistance to guerrilla struggle – II

• ANF
• NEWS DESK
• Friday, 15 August 2025, 13:52

The executive council attending the meeting took action by assigning tasks among themselves. During this process, our executive council operating inside the country received a message from President Öcalan. A group of comrades arrived at the meeting venue, delivering the message from President Öcalan, which emphasized that an action must be carried out without further delay. In that message, President Öcalan stated, “Either we go to war, or we lay down our arms.”

The action plan was shared with these comrades, and they were invited to join. They agreed and participated. The messenger was Comrade Xalit from Bingöl, a brave militant who had joined from Libya. In 1987, he was ambushed and killed around Kiğı by traitors, agents, and village guards.

The planned actions were carried out in Eruh and Şemdinli, except for Çatak. The Şemdinli team organized directly at the action site, reviewing the plans before carrying them out. The order for the action was given to Comrade Agit in the Çırav mountain in Botan. From there, he immediately moved to the Gabar area, formed the 14 July armed propaganda team, and narrowly succeeded in carrying out the Eruh action.

The Çatak action was to be carried out by Terzi Cemal (Cemal the Tailor) based on the information delivered by Ebubekir. However, Ebubekir failed to locate Terzi Cemal in time, meaning the action order was never delivered, and no action could take place in Çatak. The Eruh and Şemdinli actions, however, were carried out successfully as planned. Two-thirds of the overall plan succeeded, with much of the intended scope achieved.

The Eruh operation, militarily, was conducted as a comprehensive propaganda action involving the seizure of more than 60 weapons, while the Şemdinli operation was more combat-focused, injuring several officers in the officers’ housing complex.

The September 12 military junta kept the Eruh and Şemdinli actions secret for two days. According to what appeared in the press, they initially evaluated the raids as an uprising and developed countermeasures to suppress the reports. However, they could not keep it hidden for long. On 17 August, the BBC radio announced the Eruh and Şemdinli actions to the entire world. Once it became clear that these were not uprisings but guerrilla raids, the September 12 regime launched an annihilation operation called “Operation Sun.” They attempted to surprise both our teams with large military forces but failed to achieve results. Operation Sun was initially given a lifespan of “twenty-four hours,” then “forty-eight hours,” and later “seventy-two hours,” but they never managed to find or eliminate the guerrillas. Kenan Evren dismissed them as “remnants of the sword,” calling it “the movement of a few bandits” and assuring the state would soon settle the score. However, realizing the reality was otherwise, he personally came to visit Şemdinli. On his way back from Şemdinli, guerrilla units attacked Evren’s convoy, killing two soldiers. This not only instilled fear in the enemy ranks but also gave the guerrillas a significant boost in morale.

What 15 August brought

The Eruh and Şemdinli operations marked the beginning of the Kurdish national armed resistance against the fascist military junta of 12 September. Scholars have referred to this as “the first bullet.” In fact, 15 August signifies the transfer of the ideological victory achieved in prison to the mountains, to the guerrilla forces. It aimed to transform the victory in prison into a guerrilla victory in the mountains. In this respect, the resonance and impact of the 15 August Initiative has been immense in every sense. Above all, its influence within our organization was significant, giving great strength and morale to the guerrilla forces and making the return to the country meaningful once again. It showed the entire cadre and fighter structure what needed to be done and how. It represented the practical implementation of the armed resistance line expressed in The Role of Force in Kurdistan and its transformation into action.

In this sense, while the militant structure embraced the duties of war with enthusiasm and excitement, the few opportunistic attitudes separated themselves, leading to clarity in the militant line within the organization. The impact of the 15 August actions on the people was also profound. In the Botan-Hakkari region, where the actions took place, their resonance and influence spread rapidly among the people and began to yield results. Immediately after the actions, the young people of Botan began joining the guerrilla forces in increasing numbers.

The main impact of the action was felt in Europe, among the Kurdish communities abroad. In other areas, the actions were kept hidden from the masses for a long time. The people could not fully know or understand what had happened. However, in Europe, where the party had the means of propaganda, the Kurdish community across all regions could see what was happening in Kurdistan early and clearly. For this reason, they united with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) with great enthusiasm and participated in the struggle in a spirit of full mobilization. At the same time, the grassroots of other Kurdish organizations broke away from them, embraced the 15 August actions, and joined the PKK.

The PKK quickly became the largest Kurdish organization abroad, turning into a mass movement. With great enthusiasm, the diaspora began supporting the guerrillas with increasing material aid and by sending fighters. Similar effects were seen in Southwest Kurdistan. From 1985 onwards, the youth here gradually joined the PKK, taking to the guerrilla zones. Thus, in the Southwest as well, a national democratic community united around the PKK emerged by the early 1990s, paralleling the national revival revolution experienced in North Kurdistan.

The impact of the 15 August Offensive on the enemy front was also profound. Above all, it created a sense of fear among those who ruled the Turkish state. Although Kenan Evren called them “remnants of the sword” and “bandits,” it is known that he experienced great fear. The rulers of the Turkish state are still trying to understand and debate today why these operations could not be prevented. Some blame the then-Prime Minister Turgut Özal, while others say the military failed. In reality, neither Turgut Özal nor Kenan Evren underestimated the 15 August actions. Still, their capabilities went only so far; they could not do more. The belief of the Turkish Republic, particularly its military wing, that it was all-powerful, was in fact a profound illusion.

The 15 August Initiative, above all, revealed the truth behind this hollow illusion. It showed both to the Turkish generals uttering threats and to the entire world that their power had limits, that beyond those limits lay nothing but exaggeration and boasting.

The 15 August Initiative also had a significant impact on Europe and the United States. The United States was already the power behind the 12 September coup and fully supported the Turkish administration in every way. While the United States maintained this stance, important developments occurred within the framework of the European Union (EU). Until then, some states that had criticized the 12 September junta and sought to have Turkey expelled from the Council of Europe saw that the Turkish administration was in a difficult position after the 15 August Initiative, and they withdrew their applications, moving into an openly supportive position towards Turkey. In this context, from 1985 onwards, the Kurdish question and the fight against the PKK were brought onto the agenda of NATO and turned into a struggle conducted within the EU framework.

In contrast, Europe’s democratic circles responded to the 15 August Initiative with a different and more enthusiastic attitude. The European press generally ran headlines and commentaries such as “What was expected has happened,” “A new Kurdish uprising has begun,” and “A belated uprising has started against the 12 September coup.”

In fact, many circles had expected resistance to develop in Turkey much earlier against the 12 September military coup, since the armed resistance of the revolutionary youth movement in Turkey had gained rapid momentum following the 12 March coup. Taking this into account, these circles had calculated that a stronger and faster resistance would emerge after the 12 September coup. However, not only did such resistance fail to materialize, but it was also spread over a considerable period and delayed. In reality, the expected resistance against the 12 September military coup on the Turkey front was neither developed nor initiated by the circles who had been anticipated to do so. The resistance launched by the PKK also came somewhat late. Yet, as a successful initiative, it was launched in mid-August 1984 on a basis that would influence the entire political agenda.

The most notable impact of the 15 August Initiative was observed on the Turkish and Kurdish organizations, which had largely relocated to Europe and begun to live in exile. These organizations entered into a competition to curse the 15 August Initiative. Among themselves, they achieved their greatest alliance and unity on the basis of distributing leaflets condemning and insulting the 15 August Initiative. These groups published statements bearing the signatures of 40 to 50 organizations that denounced the 15 August Initiative. They accused the PKK of “being agents,” “leading the people to massacre,” and “being terrorists.” Efforts to portray the PKK as “terrorist” to the world were made primarily by these organizations, led by Kemal Burkay. These circles even went as far as offering advice to the 12 September fascist military regime, declaring, “Give us the opportunity and means, and we will conduct the struggle against the PKK in the best way.” The administration of Turgut Özal eventually gave them this opportunity, and many of them joined the state front, starting a war against the PKK and the 15 August Initiative.

While the 15 August Initiative showed its most notable impact in this way, the military planning of the operations covered a period of about three months. This planning envisaged that the existing organized guerrilla teams in the Botan-Hakkari region would be in constant action against enemy forces during the three-month period from 15 August to 15 November. It was further foreseen that, during the upcoming winter season, the results of this three-month practice would be evaluated, and the planning for 1985 could be prepared accordingly. Within this framework, during the three-month period, actions continued in all areas. There was a clean and effective campaign of action against military targets, which was not particularly intense but kept the struggle alive. Strong blows were struck against military targets in Hakkari and Botan. This period of actions continued successfully from the guerrilla’s perspective. During the three-month war period, the guerrilla forces lost one fighter in Gabar. Our comrade Kerim Baykara, from Derik in Mardin, was killed partly due to the schemes of a collaborator-agent structure.

During this time, under the planning of Ebubekir, which was criticized and not accepted by our movement, a raid was carried out on the village of Sipiryan. Neither our guerrilla command, nor President Öcalan or our party leadership approved of this. Such a style of operation was defined and condemned as banditry from the very beginning. On this basis, it became clear that, regardless of the justification, a military attack that does not clearly define its target cannot be part of the PKK line of action.

The history of war begins to be written

Based on the 15 August Initiative, the results of the three-month war were assessed during the winter of 1984–1985 by both the state and the PKK and new plans for the coming year were discussed. In December 1984, our guerrilla command that had carried out the 15 August Initiative held a meeting in the Miros area on the slopes of Avaşîn, evaluating the results of the three-month practice and working to plan the struggle for 1985. At this meeting, President Öcalan presented his first comprehensive directive assessing the 15 August process. Delivered in the form of an audio cassette, this evaluation explained the process, stated that a historic period had begun, highlighted the duties and responsibilities undertaken, stressed the need to proceed with determination, and expressed confidence that a history-making development could be achieved with the party’s pioneering leadership standing behind everyone engaged in this struggle. Through this assessment, President Öcalan gave morale and courage to the cadres and fighters who had participated in, organized, and commanded the struggle. On this basis, the guerrilla command evaluated practical activities and sought to prepare the 1985 plan in detail. The situation was no mystery: the state was using winter to gather strength and was preparing to launch an offensive in 1985 to take revenge for the 15 August process. This was not difficult to foresee. In this context, the side that was better planned and prepared, moved earlier, and maintained the initiative would win 1985. With this understanding, efforts were made to plan for the year. The strategy envisaged focusing more on the Mardin area, where the winter was mild, so that the guerrilla forces could enter an operational phase before winter ended, maintain the initiative, and neutralize enemy attacks. However, various factors prevented the implementation of this plan. One of the factors that hindered it was the failure of some individuals assigned to duties to fulfill their responsibilities.

It must be noted here that the figure known as Kör Cemal (Cemal the Blind) played a highly negative role. Despite taking on responsibilities in areas where he had the most knowledge and capacity to act, he did not engage in practical combat. Kör Cemal did not go beyond Botan, and as a result, the guerrilla forces were unable to take operational steps in 1985 to maintain the initiative. Furthermore, as winter drew to a close, the seasonal conditions became even more unfavorable. This situation led to a narrowing of the mobility of some cadre-level commanders, arrests, and ultimately the inability to carry out the planning. In addition, there were instances of surrender. This resulted in the exposure of routes and connections both in Botan and along the Botan–Garzan line, providing the enemy with concrete and detailed information. Similar to the Elazığ arrests of 1979, it was a situation comparable to the role played by Şahin Dönmez. Individuals such as Nebi (Ali Ozansoy), who surrendered and later became one of the founders of the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism (JİTEM), and others who surrendered afterward, gave the enemy extensive information about both Botan and Garzan, as well as about our party’s organizational structures and our mass relations.

Using this information to its advantage, the enemy launched a large-scale offensive against Botan in mid-February 1985, within the framework of what it termed an “uprising suppression operation.” Before the snow had melted and while winter still gripped the entire region, military outposts were established around all villages, and mass arrests were carried out based on pre-prepared lists. In the face of these measures, the guerrilla forces lost the initiative and were unable to develop the resistance. This situation was also influenced by clashes that had erupted in the external arena with the Iraqi Communist Party and similar forces. Taking advantage of the resulting conditions, the Turkish army dealt blows to poorly organized guerrilla units in Botan and Zagros, units lacking clear objectives and without a defined operational style. By mid-summer, guerrilla groups of two or three fighters were repeatedly targeted and hit. For the first time since the 15 August Initiative, our guerrilla movement suffered losses of such magnitude. Certain individual attitudes, marked by fearfulness in the face of war, reluctance, and approaches that could be defined as liquidationism, also caused serious harm to the guerrilla forces during this period, leading to further losses.

However, this situation did not last long. In August 1985, the lost initiative was regained. At this time, a meeting of the executive council was held in Botan to assess the period between February and August. Those whose approaches had led to the loss of initiative, failures, and losses were condemned and removed from the leadership. On this basis, a process of reorganization and repositioning of forces was carried out, and, based on the newly developed plan, the 1985 operational campaign was advanced. Within the scope of this plan, the guerrilla unit commanded by Comrade Agit carried out highly effective actions in Western Botan. Operations targeted the Alixan-Tatar bandit network, which sought to expand the village guard system. In many areas, military targets were hit and military outposts dismantled. However, while such advances were made in Western Botan, the same could not be achieved in Eastern Botan. The unit operating in Eastern Botan again did not engage in combat. Led by a commander with a liquidationist approach, this unit effectively undermined the process that had been initiated. As a result, the executive council, which had failed to carry out the Çatak operation a year earlier, once again displayed a similarly frustrating practice of inaction in the same area. Consequently, by the end of 1985, the forces concentrated in the Habur-Beytüşşebap area were subjected to a new reorganization.

In this sense, 1985 was a turbulent year that resulted in serious losses. In his assessment of the 1985 practice, President Öcalan emphasized the need to correct the approach that had caused these losses and to ensure a renewal on this basis. He stated that if these corrections could not be implemented, a congress should be convened to remove those responsible and condemn their approach. Within this framework, President Öcalan presented comprehensive evaluations. Delivered under the title “November directives,” these assessments also had the character of a congress report. Instead of absorbing and internalizing these evaluations, developing congress-level work based on them, reorganizing, and showing the will to take on duties and responsibilities, the executive council conducting the practical work adopted an attitude of evading responsibility and retreating, seeking to go to congress while shifting duties and responsibilities onto President Öcalan. In a process where such an approach emerged, a significant cadre from the leadership level was transferred to President Öcalan’s area for the congress. Comrade Agit, who had gone to this area after the Miros meeting in the winter of 1984–1985 and evaluated the 15 August Initiative process together with him and who was already in a position of leading the practical struggle and guerrilla warfare, moved to the Botan area to continue his duties. If the opportunity arose, he would proceed from there to the President’s area to participate in the Third Congress. In the event that he could not reach the President’s area, he would focus his work on Botan, organizing and leading the guerrilla forces there, while the results of the Third Congress would be conveyed to him.

Commander Agit falls a martyr

A reorganization carried out on this basis marked the beginning of the winter of 1985–1986 and initiated the process of the Third Congress. By then, the war had advanced, and relationships had taken on new forms accordingly. However, the reality on the ground did not match the plans, and reaching the Third Congress, as well as convening it, proved to be an endeavor full of obstacles and difficulties, taking a very long time. The congress platform could only be formed in the summer of 1986. In the spring of 1985, various obstacles, unrest, and dysfunctional tendencies that had complicated matters also sabotaged the preparation environment for the congress, causing the work to remain weak and preventing it from being carried out on time. Nevertheless, the Third Congress evaluated the 15 August Initiative, condemned the mentality, understanding, and attitudes that posed obstacles to the guerrilla, and put forward the determination, will, and capacity for decision-making and planning to make the 15 August Initiative permanent and to develop the guerrilla forces on this basis. During the winter of 1985–1986, Comrade Agit functioned as the sole command authority directing the guerrilla in Botan. Because crossing the border was difficult, he was unable to attend the environment of the Third Congress and remained in Botan. In the spring, during the Newroz period, after delivering several blows to the enemy with actions in Gabar and thus initiating the 1986 struggle with actions, he came to the Habur area planning to learn the results of the Third Congress. On 28 March 1986, he fell a martyr in circumstances that remain unclear. Following Comrade Agit’s martyrdom, the enemy had newspapers print the headline “PKK executioner killed.” For a long time, the killing of Comrade Agit was used to pump morale into chauvinistic circles in Turkey.

Comrade Agit’s martyrdom left a profound mark on the reality of the Third Congress. The congress developed a process of critical self-evaluation based on Agit’s standards and personal qualities, taking his command and combat characteristics as the foundation. Accountability was carried out in accordance with these measures. In the context of national liberation, President Öcalan defined the measure of party-building through Agit’s character and called on everyone to renew themselves and reach this level according to these party-building standards. In this sense, the Third Congress became a comprehensive congress of criticism and self-criticism. It was marked by the determination to oppose every form of individualism, reactionary attitude, conservatism, and liquidationist tendency, as well as all forms of compromise, defined as “middle-of-the-road” attitudes and behaviors, by showing the will and capacity to develop the guerrilla along the line represented by Agit.

At the same time, the Third Congress condemned and judged the personalities of Fatma and Selim, whose conduct could be seen as an extension of a provocative and liquidationist tendency that challenged, weakened, and caused harm to the guerrilla offensive and the 15 August initiative. It also critically and self-critically examined and condemned every form of “middle-of-the-road” attitude and behavior that provided ground for this liquidationism, failed to overcome it, and thereby weakened the development of the guerrilla, enabling the enemy to deliver effective blows. Identified as a middle-class tendency, these individualistic, reactionary, and conservative approaches were confronted with the weapon of self-criticism. In their place, the congress fostered the development of the devoted militant personality standards of the guerrilla line, the Agit line, and the freedom line.

The End

(Compiled from the PKK’s Serxwebun 30th Anniversary Special Issue)