‘Armenia is looking for ways to breathe’

As cards are being reshuffled around the world, Pashinyan certainly intends to slowly untie the moorings without a complete break. However, it must be acknowledged that the maneuverability of a small and poor country, especially in such a world, is not easy at all.

Bureaucratic preparations for the start of direct trade between Turkey and Armenia were completed as of May 11, as part of steps taken within the framework of the normalization process ongoing since 2022.

Technical and bureaucratic work continues regarding the opening of the common border between the two countries.

With the new regulation, it has become possible for goods going from Turkey to Armenia via a third country, or arriving via the same route, to have their final destination or point of origin written as “Armenia/Turkey.”

Masis Kürkçügil, a Armenian writer and publisher from Turkey, emphasized that the normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations should now be read not only on the level of bilateral relations but through the power balances in the South Caucasus.

According to Kürkçügil, the closure of the border and the freezing of relations between the two countries were directly linked to the Karabakh issue. Kürkçügil says that today, conditions have “changed radically” due to both Russia’s weakening regional influence following the invasion of Ukraine and Azerbaijan’s strengthening position on the ground.

‘A result of Karabakh resolution in favor of Azerbaijan’

How do you assess the commencement of direct trade between Turkey and Armenia and the ongoing technical preparations for opening the border? On the one hand, this is a process that has been on the agenda for years; but how might the taking of concrete steps this time affect the regional balance of power in the South Caucasus? And in your view, in what ways does the current stage differ from previous normalization efforts?

The closure of the border was a decision taken by Ankara regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. Considering the internal unrest in Azerbaijan, Russia’s undisputed power in

the region, and other factors at the time, conditions today have changed radically. Russia, particularly due to its quagmire in the invasion of Ukraine, has severely damaged its military prestige. In contrast, Azerbaijan has begun to assert its influence in the region with the support of Israel and Turkey. Armenia, on the other hand, is ultimately a small and impoverished country. Additionally, there remains an unresolved power struggle between the pro-Russian faction and the current administration, which seeks to act more independently.

The opening of the border is a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue being resolved in the manner desired by the Aliyev administration. Ankara was already conducting its relations with Armenia entirely under Baku’s shadow. The Karabakh issue has been resolved. Armenia, feeling trapped, is trying to catch its breath.

Is is truly ‘normalization’?

How might progress in Turkey-Armenia normalization affect Azerbaijan’s regional position and its relations with Armenia? Are the boundaries of normalization still defined along the Azerbaijan-Armenia border?

With Iran being weakened by U.S. imperialism, Azerbaijan may feel even more empowered. After all, its ally is Israel! Turkey-Armenia normalization is entirely dependent on Baku’s will. To what extent can the opening of the border be considered “normalization”? This is debatable. Of course, the fundamental issue lies in the relationship between Baku and Yerevan. From the very beginning, Ankara has not harbored any intention of acting as an independent variable or a mediator or facilitator. For Turkey, there is no issue under discussion other than the “genocide” issue. Of course, millennia-old Central Asian dreams may sound appealing; but much has changed in those lands since the 1990s.

For many years, Armenia was viewed as a country dependent on Russia in the areas of security, border control, energy, and the economy. How does the normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations and Armenia’s increased engagement with the West challenge Russia’s traditional role in the South Caucasus?

Just how much security this provides became clear when 120,000 people were forced to flee from Nagorno-Karabakh. Energy dependence is quite serious; Armenia meets two-thirds of its needs from Russia, and Russian “influence” is widespread. On the other hand, compared to, say, Azerbaijan or a number of countries with a similar history, politics in Armenia is relatively more reasonable. It’s not even necessary to describe the Azerbaijani regime.

Armenia has a peculiar diaspora. It thus has direct ties to the West. Despite having no colonial past, it is among the Francophone nations. In other words, its relationship with the West is, in a sense, inevitable—it is already a de facto reality. Most of its population is already in the diaspora. Especially after independence, due to poverty, nearly half of the population at that time scattered to the four corners of the world in search of work. Armenia’s remaining under Russian influence holds significance for Russia’s regional hegemony; but the cost of this has begun to weigh heavily on Armenia. Of course, Russia’s traditional role in the South Caucasus also grants it a natural right to this. It is certain that this will be used not for the benefit of the region’s peoples, but for the Russia envisioned by Putin. While one might say it has returned to Georgia, it is important to remember that behind Russia’s influence in the region, the local oligarchs are deeply intertwined with Russia.

‘Seeking ways to breathe’

How do the multifaceted relations that Armenia has developed simultaneously with Russia, Iran, Turkey, the U.S., and the EU point to a “policy of balance” that goes beyond traditional alliance patterns? In this context, how should we interpret the strategic orientation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s administration?

Armenia holds no trump card for either regional or international policy. Consequently, rather than pursuing a balancing act, it is seeking ways to breathe. The cost of Russian influence has been heavy. It must be noted immediately that Pashinyan did not support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; he opposed it. In contrast, the Nagorno-Karabakh administration at the time supported the invasion. Indeed, when Putin condemned Zelenskyy’s participation in the European Political Community meeting with a fury that defied diplomacy, Pashinyan reiterated this stance. Economic difficulties do not allow for an immediate severing of old ties, but these old economic ties are not lifting Armenia out of poverty either.

On another front, how might the tensions Pashinyan faces domestically with church circles and certain nationalist actors affect this search for a new direction in foreign policy?

There is no point in drawing a distinction between domestic and foreign policy. Unlike many leaders in the region, Pashinyan is not from the old state apparatus or the military; he came to power backed by a significant popular movement and strong social support. The church, and especially former Karabakh-based leaders, along with the oligarchs, operate primarily under Moscow’s shadow.

As the cards are being reshuffled worldwide, Pashinyan naturally intends to loosen the ropes gradually without making a complete break. However, one must acknowledge that the maneuvering capacity of a small and impoverished country—especially in such a world—is by no means easy. 

(TY/VK)