Recent debates centered around Tom Barrack, the United States Ambassador to Ankara and Syria envoy, compelled me to turn to the archives. Allegations that the Kurds are no longer merely being pressured into political alignment with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly linked to Al-Qaeda, but are now expected to submit to them, may initially appear to be a tactical maneuver. Yet when I grasped the deeper historical echoes of this development, I came across a text that refreshed my memory. In the archives of Le Monde Diplomatique, I found an article by Eric Rouleau that helped illuminate today’s tensions in Syria by casting light back to the year 1957.
Eric Rouleau, born in Heliopolis, Egypt, to a Jewish family of Aleppo origin, was one of the most respected journalists of his time. He had the rare opportunity to observe the complexities of the Middle East both from within and from a diplomatic vantage point. In 1985, he was appointed ambassador by François Mitterrand and went on to serve in Tunisia and Turkey. In an article he wrote in October 1957, Rouleau described how the Eisenhower Doctrine faltered in Syria.
This doctrine had been formulated by the United States as a strategy to counter Soviet expansionism. It provided Washington with a framework under which it reserved the right to intervene, militarily and economically, if any state in the Middle East came under communist threat. But when the doctrine was first tested in Syria, it encountered unexpected resistance.
As Syria moved closer to the Soviet Union, the United States sought to mobilize the countries surrounding it. Pressure was applied on Damascus through Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. However, the idea of such an intervention was met with strong backlash from Arab public opinion. Arms shipments to Jordan were met with assurances such as, “These weapons will be used not against Arab unity, but in defense against the Israeli threat.” King Saud personally visited Syria in a show of solidarity. No Arab government was willing to risk appearing, in the eyes of its own people, as a partner to Western intervention in Syria.
As Rouleau put it, the Eisenhower Doctrine “collapsed morally” as well, because no strategy that ignored local sensitivities could ever succeed.
Today, nearly seventy years later, the stage may have changed, but the script bears striking similarities. This time, the United States is attempting to balance its presence in Syria by pressuring the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to sit at the same table with HTS, a former enemy with whom they share no common vision, and to negotiate around American interests. The target is no longer the Soviet Union, but Iran and the power vacuums expected to emerge in the post-Assad order. The narrative that HTS has become a “moderate” and “acceptable” actor is being rapidly put into practice by Washington. Yet how the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and the SDF will respond to this development remains to be seen and is unfolding on a much quieter front.
But there is no doubt that a silent tension is unfolding. As someone who witnessed the field between 2016 and 2021, and as a member of a people who fought side by side with the United States for a decade and paid an enormous price, I can say this with certainty: forcing North and East Syria into reconciliation with a force that directly threatens its security is not a pragmatic move, but rather, without question, a deeply wounding policy. The Kurdish resistance to such pressure is not only understandable; it is entirely justified.
In 1957, when the United States attempted direct intervention, it was met with a unified response from the Arab community. Today, instead of direct involvement, we are witnessing indirect pressure constructed through the orchestration of local actors. But the essence remains unchanged. What was once perceived as a threat to Syria’s sovereignty now manifests as a form of pressure targeting the Kurdish pursuit of self-governance. What both cases share is the imposition of externally scripted scenarios that ignore the memory, fragility, and aspirations of the local actors on the ground.
The United States has at times found allies in the Middle East, and at other times identified enemies. But its most frequent mistake has been to reduce the presence of peoples on the ground to mere pieces on a chessboard. Today, the roadmap proposed through the voice of Tom Barrack, whose record is already the subject of serious debate and who currently serves as both the United States Ambassador to Ankara and Syria envoy, does not only represent a tactical setback for the Kurds, but may also shatter the fragile trust the Kurds have painstakingly built with the United States through years of sacrifice. The cost of such ruptures is not limited to the battlefield; they accumulate in the memory of future generations.
Niccolò Machiavelli, one of the founding thinkers of political science, once said, “There is no place for morality in politics, for politics aims solely at power.” In a region where everything is entangled, where every issue is interconnected, especially when it comes to Kurdistan, envisioning coherent strategies is no easy task. But the determined and courageous stance of Rojava’s political actors, who are shaped by a revolutionary tradition, will ultimately prevail.
In the Middle East, success cannot be achieved through military power alone, nor through rigid ideological doctrines. True success is only possible through diplomacy that acknowledges the historical memory of peoples, respects regional dynamics, and affirms the autonomy of local actors.
Source: ANF News
