Today marks the anniversary of the İstanbul Pogrom of September 6-7, 1955 (Greek: Σεπτεμβριανά, Septemvriana).
Sixty-nine years ago, on this day at 1.00 pm, a report was broadcast on the state radio that the house where Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the republic, was born in Thessaloniki, Greece, was bombed. The news was later headlined in the İstanbul Ekspres, a newspaper aligned with the Democratic Party, the ruling party of the time, as “Our Father’s House Bombed.” This report ignited a wave of attacks targeting Greek, Armenian, and Jewish communities in Turkey.
Crowds gathered in İstanbul and İzmir, primarily attacking Greek-owned businesses, churches, and homes. The violence involved looting, arson, and physical assaults. According to the human rights organization Helsinki Watch, 15 people were killed in the attacks. It is estimated that between 4,000 and 5,000 homes and shops were looted, dozens of people were injured, and numerous women were sexually assaulted. Following the attacks, many Greeks were forced to leave Turkey.
In light of the anniversary, we spoke with researcher and writer Foti Benlisoy, who is himself a Greek from İstanbul, about the manifestations of societal violence both in the past and today.
Differences
Do you see any parallels between the social and political dynamics behind the 6-7 September Pogrom and the recent attacks on refugees?
Both yes and no. There are undoubtedly significant parallels between the recent anti-migrant pogroms and the 6-7 September Pogrom. However, focusing solely on these similarities might lead to an ahistorical stance, emphasizing formal parallels between different instances of racist violence without considering their specific contexts. For this reason, I think it is important first to discuss the significant differences.
As is well known, the 6-7 September Pogrom, although it had effects in other cities like İzmir and Antakya, was primarily a mass campaign of terror targeting the non-Muslim communities in İstanbul, especially the Greeks. It is estimated that nearly 100,000 people were involved in the attacks in some way. Considering the population at the time, this is a massive figure. Moreover, the attacks affected nearly all of İstanbul. Given its scale, it is difficult to compare the events of 6-7 September with the examples you mentioned. The 6-7 September Pogrom is more comparable to the Armenian pogroms and massacres in İstanbul in 1895-96 or the 1909 massacres in Adana. These events were state-supported or state-approved large-scale nationalist social mobilizations with murderous intent.
‘Racial regime’
The issue is not just the scale of 6-7 September. The attacks on immigrants today and the events of 6-7 September represent what Cedric Robinson calls two distinct “racial regimes.” The 6-7 September Pogrom can be seen as part of a historical process that began at least as far back as the Balkan Wars, in which the non-Muslim population in Turkey was increasingly excluded from the national body and identified as an “internal enemy.” The construction of Turkish national identity often involved an implicit or explicit internal war against the country’s non-Muslim communities. Thus, Turkey’s non-Muslims have historically been positioned as the constitutive or foundational “others” in the formation of Turkish national identity.
As a result, non-Muslims in Turkey have continued to be systematically framed, controlled, and surveilled. Consequently, non-Muslims in Turkey have been subjected to a persistent pattern of systematic framing, control, and surveillance. To use a more contemporary term, they have been subjected to a regime of systemic mobbing. This systemic or institutional racism against non-Muslim communities in Turkey is intertwined with the processes of early capital accumulation, the shaping of the capitalist state apparatus, and class formation. Therefore, it is not simply a matter of national prejudices or nationalist clichés born from negative historical experiences. The events of September 6-7 should be viewed as a continuation and manifestation of this systemic mobbing regime, rather than as an exceptional incident or a historical breaking point.
Collective lynch mobs
The growing pogroms and collective lynching attempts against migrants today are part of another racial regime, connected to a different process of capital accumulation where the migrant population in Turkey is seen as a systematically oppressed pool of cheap labor. The issue is not limited to anti-migrant attacks or instances of overt racism. Migrants today, like the Greek or Armenian communities of the 1930s, are subjected to systematic and institutional control and surveillance.
Where they live, under what conditions, the jobs they can be employed in, whether they can travel, and how they can access public services are all regulated by administrative and legal practices that continuously reinforce their status as “migrants.” Racism is not only perpetuated through lynching and overt attacks but also through these everyday and “normal” administrative and legal practices, which naturalize and reinforce racial hierarchies. Therefore, the events of September 6-7 and the recent anti-migrant incidents should be examined in connection with two different historical conjunctures and racial regimes. Discussing the parallels between them without considering these differences risks reducing racism to mere verbal or physical aggression, ignoring its systemic and institutional dimensions.
History of the republic
To touch briefly on the parallels you mentioned, one common mistake is to view September 6-7 as an exception, a breaking point that ended İstanbul’s “multicultural” life. However, the history of the Republic is also a history of daily, low-intensity, and “ordinary” lynchings and attacks against non-Muslim communities. Campaigns like “Citizens, Speak Turkish!” or trials for “insulting Turkishness” point to the existence of a systematic harassment regime that continually targeted non-Muslim communities. Today, migrants are facing a similar situation. In other words, we do not need a high-profile case like those in Altındağ or Kayseri to discuss racist aggression. Just consider the recent racist attack on a migrant child traveling on Marmaray. Similar “everyday” attacks on non-Muslims were also quite common in the 1930s or in the months leading up to September 1955.
The pogrom of September 6-7 can be seen as the culmination of widespread and daily attacks, intensifying overnight through state-organized or sanctioned actions, driven by a promise of implicit impunity. We are not yet at that point with anti-migrant racist violence and lynching cases. Keeping anti-migrant racism at a simmer benefits the ruling powers. The controlled level of racism against migrants provides a form of pressure that helps to discipline migrant workers. More importantly, it diverts the social anger caused by the economic and social disasters for which the ruling powers are responsible, directing it instead towards migrants as scapegoats. This allows the lower classes’ frustration to be depoliticized and redirected towards those who are even more vulnerable. This situation, however, could change in the future; we could very well face more severe attacks in terms of both scale and intensity. The racist rage that could fuel a new September 6-7 is already very present in Turkey.
Role of the media
During the events of September 6-7, the media played a provocative role in inciting violence. How do you assess the role of the media today in spreading negative perceptions of refugees?
You’re right. In both cases, the media has played a critical role in manufacturing a “moral panic.” In the lead-up to September 6-7, the determination to reproduce long-standing themes that portrayed non-Muslim communities, particularly the Greeks, as an “internal enemy” threatening national security was evident in popular media outlets on a massive scale. A similar situation is happening today. We see migrants being labeled as the perpetrators of a “silent invasion” that threatens national survival and disrupts the existing demographic structure.
There are two key differences to highlight here: First is the role of social media today in spreading and amplifying racist arguments. Furthermore, social media platforms play a notable role in organizing collective lynchings “in the field.” The second issue is the surprising speed at which international racist themes (such as “silent invasion” or “the great displacement”) are borrowed and integrated. Many of the anti-immigrant racist arguments circulating today are based on themes that are also widely used in Western countries.
Colonial governance
Could the failure of society to confront similar historical acts of violence and massacres lay the groundwork for contemporary attacks on refugees?
Confronting or reckoning with past crimes does not automatically or “guaranteedly” serve as a barrier to similar crimes committed today or in the future.
Germany today offers a good example of this. Although Germany has undergone a process of confronting, albeit incomplete, with the Shoah, or Holocaust, this has not prevented it from actively supporting the genocidal war that Israel is conducting today. I’m not saying that confronting or questioning past crimes is unimportant, of course. What I am saying is that unless the material structures of exploitation and dominance that produced these historical crimes are dismantled, we are likely to encounter similar crimes under different circumstances.
When it comes to racist violence, it’s essential to remember that racism is never just about incited chauvinistic stereotypes or stoked national prejudices.
For example, anti-Kurdish racism in Turkey does not stem from prejudice, ignorance, or generic nationalism. It is directly caused by the current structure of the national state and its colonial governance practices. In other words, racism is the product of specific material structures of exploitation and domination, and unless those structures are dismantled or challenged by strong political and social movements, it is inevitable that we will encounter different manifestations of racism.
The role of the state in the pogrom
During the events of September 6-7, the state’s intervention in the attacks was controversial. Large parts of society also remained silent during the attacks. How do you interpret society’s reaction to today’s attacks on refugees?
Honestly, I don’t think the state’s intervention in the attacks during September 6-7 was controversial at all. The September 6-7 “pogrom,” as its name suggests, was a widespread collective lynching attempt in which the state participated directly through various means or, at the very least, supported indirectly. As I mentioned earlier, there was significant public participation in the pogrom. Even though a large portion of society may not have actively participated in the attacks, it’s likely that many either passively supported them or chose to remain neutral.
When racist arguments that legitimize such large-scale attacks become dominant, and when there is no other political or social force to fundamentally oppose these arguments, this outcome becomes inevitable. Today, the situation is not much different, and it’s not hard to imagine that anti-refugee racist attacks will likely increase in number and impact.
The shock of redistribution
Recently, stray animals on the streets have become targets of increasing violence. Do you think this paves the way for attacks on other disadvantaged groups?
The government responsible for managing perhaps the harshest redistribution shock in Turkey’s history has embraced moral panics and sadistic populism as a form of crisis management. The recent legal changes that propose the isolation and killing of stray animals are a clear expression of this trend. The government actively creates channels to direct the anger it has caused downward, ensuring it doesn’t target those at the top. By demonizing certain social groups and making them targets, the government diverts frustration away from the ruling elite. At the same time, it offers those at the bottom a false sense of empowerment by allowing them to participate in violence against these groups. This applies not only to LGBTI+s and refugees but also to street animals.
The regime, which is struggling to manage both the lower and upper classes at the same time—meaning it’s losing its ability to integrate the conflicting interests of elite factions and offer concessions to lower-class demands—is increasingly turning to moral panics as a crisis management tool. By spreading violence and repression across everyday life, the regime normalizes authoritarian practices and state violence as governance techniques, embedding them into all areas of life.
Moral panic
But moral panic doesn’t just shape the organization of violence and repression from above; they also create a foundation for violence to be shared and spread from below. Social sadism fueled by neoliberalism’s decadence—what we might call “sadistic populism”—accompanies these moral panics. This isn’t populism based on material promises that could alleviate the daily struggles of the lower classes or make poverty manageable. Instead, it offers the guilty pleasure of participating, directly or indirectly, in the oppression of targeted groups—whether they be refugees, LGBTI+s, Kurds, or even stray dogs.
The proposed legislation that could lead to the “confinement” or killing of street dogs is a prime example of “sadistic populism” unique to this late neoliberal period, where the promise of upward mobility and prosperity has become a distant dream.
For the ruling elite, if meaningful improvements in the material conditions of the lower classes cannot be achieved, the next best option is to channel the frustration and dissatisfaction caused by worsening conditions away from the ruling class and toward a targeted group. Watching this group suffer—or even participating in their suffering—provides a perverse sense of compensation for the material hardship people face. Thus, managing and distributing suffering becomes the primary governance technique. Nationalist-chauvinist aggression, misogyny, open hatred toward LGBTI+s, imperial nostalgia sold through conspiracy theories, and a thirst for militaristic greatness—all these things are increasingly associated with this sadistic populist trend.
What social and political steps should be taken to prevent similar massacres?
The most crucial step, in my opinion, is the development of a strong, widespread anti-racist movement that challenges racism in all its forms and targets the institutions, administrative, and legal practices that perpetuate it. There’s no easy solution or universal remedy for this problem… (TY/VK)
Source: BIANET
