Turkey’s crackdown on İstanbul mayor and its broader implications

İstanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu was detained yesterday on corruption and terrorism-related charges at a time when he was preparing to be declared the Republican People’s Party (CHP) candidate for the 2028 presidential election. His detention follows a series of investigations and lawsuits targeting CHP-run municipalities in İstanbul since October.

Now, İmamoğlu, one of Turkey’s most prominent opposition figures who is seen as a strong challenger to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, faces the risk of losing both his chance to run for president and his position as mayor of İstanbul.

What are the legal grounds for the investigation?

İmamoğlu and 105 others, including municipal officials, are facing charges in two separate investigations, one related to terrorism and the other to corruption.

The terrorism-related accusations stem from CHP’s cooperation with the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party in last year’s municipal elections. While DEM did not endorse İmamoğlu and fielded its own candidate for the metropolitan municipality, the two parties coordinated at the district level.

Under this strategy dubbed as “urban consensus,” DEM did not field candidates in some districts, including two with large Kurdish populations, Esenyurt and Güngören, while CHP replaced its pre-selected candidates for these two districts with names approved by DEM. In several other districts, DEM candidates also ran for municipal council seats on CHP’s lists. In the end, CHP secured a majority in the city council, which comprises members of district councils.

Prosecutors launched investigations into this cooperation, claiming that it was orchestrated by the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). They cited statements from PKK leaders during the election period encouraging DEM to cooperate with the opposition as the basis for the allegations. Prosecutors allege the Peoples’ Democratic Congress (HDK), a coalition of pro-Kurdish and leftist groups, also played a role in the urban consensus under the instructions of the PKK.

In October, Esenyurt Mayor Ahmet Özer, a Kurdish academic, was arrested on charges of membership in a terrorist organization, and the Interior Ministry appointed a trustee to replace him. In February, 10 municipal officials, including deputy mayors and council members from six different İstanbul districts, were arrested on similar charges. Now, the latest phase of the probe has reached İmamoğlu, along with the İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality’s deputy secretary-general, and the mayor and the deputy mayor of the Şişli district, all of whom are being held on charges of aiding a terrorist organization.

The corruption investigation includes 100 suspects, including mayor of the Beylikdüzü district, focusing on alleged financial misconduct in multiple municipal subsidiaries, including road construction company İsfalt, cultural and arts organization Kültür A.Ş., housing developer Kiptaş, and media firm Medya A.Ş.

Prosecutors claim that İmamoğlu led a “criminal organization for profit” and have listed charges including bribery, embezzlement, fraud, and bid rigging. The Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office referred to the case in an official statement as the “Ekrem İmamoğlu Criminal Organization.”

Meanwhile, İmamoğlu is also facing two additional criminal cases. One accuses him of “attempting to influence the judiciary,” while the other alleges he “marked a counterterrorism official as a target for terrorist groups.” In January, he testified in both cases, which could result in lengthy prison sentences.

Will İmamoğlu be removed from office?

Under Article 127 of the Turkish Constitution, the Interior Ministry has the authority to suspend mayors under investigation in connection with their duties. This means İmamoğlu can legally be removed from office.

Although the Constitution describes this as a temporary measure, in practice, mayors dismissed through this process have never been reinstated since 2016. The government has consistently used this mechanism to take over municipalities controlled by pro-Kurdish parties, making it effectively a permanent removal rather than a suspension.

Another possibility is that if İmamoğlu may be replaced through an election at the city council if he is found guilty of corruption-related charges.

How has the public reacted?

Since İmamoğlu’s detention, all major social media and messaging platforms, including X, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, and Telegram, have been throttled in Turkey, significantly reducing speeds. Authorities also closed access to Taksim Square’s metro station in İstanbul yesterday morning in what was seen as measures aimed at curbing potential protests.

The CHP yesterday organized protests outside its headquarters in Ankara and outside İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality, with thousands in attendance. It held smaller demonstrations took place in other cities, while students in İstanbul and Ankara held large campus protests. While student protests continued today in İstanbul as well as other cities, no mass public uprising has been observed so far.

How has the ruling bloc responded?

The ruling bloc has reacted cautiously so far. Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s key ally, urged calm and patience, dismissing opposition claims that the operation was a “coup.”

Justice Minister Yılmaz Tunç echoed this sentiment, saying that “independent courts are doing their job” and urging the opposition not to take the issue to the streets but instead to defend themselves in court.

Erdoğan, meanwhile, has remained silent so far. As is often the case during politically charged moments, he may wait a few days before weighing in on the issue. Yesterday, he attended an iftar dinner with farmers, where he avoided any mention of İmamoğlu, focusing instead on agricultural policies and government support for farmers.

How did İmamoğlu become a leading opposition figure?

İmamoğlu has been a target of government pressure since 2019, when he narrowly won the İstanbul mayoral election. The results were annulled over alleged vote counting irregularities, but he won the re-run by a landslide, ending the AKP and its predecessors’ 25-year dominance in Turkey’s largest city, which began when Erdoğan was elected the mayor in 1994.

Since then, İmamoğlu has positioned himself beyond local politics, frequently making national-level statements and traveling across Turkey. His strong oratory skills and combative political style set him apart from then-CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who was seen as a softer, less charismatic figure. This increased his popularity and led to speculation that İmamoğlu could be a strong challenger to Erdoğan ahead of the 2023 presidential election.

Before that election, which was widely seen as Erdoğan’s toughest during his two-decade rule mostly due to a dire economic situation, İmamoğlu and Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavaş, also a CHP member, were the most popular potential opposition candidates. However, Kılıçdaroğlu insisted on running himself.

At the time, Meral Akşener, leader of the Good (İYİ) Party, the main ally of the CHP, opposed Kılıçdaroğlu’s candidacy, warning he would not win and instead urging İmamoğlu or Yavaş to run. To secure Akşener’s support, Kılıçdaroğlu promised to make both vice presidents if he won, but he eventually lost to Erdoğan. Many still believe that it was a missed opportunity and if İmamoğlu had run instead of Kılıçdaroğlu, Erdoğan could have been defeated.

After the election loss, İmamoğlu launched a “change” movement within the party, indirectly challenging Kılıçdaroğlu’s leadership. His efforts led to Özgür Özel, a candidate supported by him, defeating Kılıçdaroğlu in the party’s Nov 2023 congress.

With Özel as CHP leader, İmamoğlu entered the 2024 local elections, securing a landslide re-election in İstanbul.

Earlier this year, CHP announced it would choose its 2028 presidential candidate through a primary. In the last month, Özel, İmamoğlu, and Yavaş held a closed-door meeting on this issue. Following this, Yavaş ruled himself out, stating it was too early to discuss a presidential run. CHP then scheduled the primary for Mar 23 with İmamoğlu being the sole candidate.

In response to the latest developments, Özel has urged all party members and the public to participate in the primary and rally against what he called “a political coup” against İmamoğlu.

What are İmamoğlu’s chances of running for president now?

One day before his detention on Mar 19, İstanbul University annulled İmamoğlu’s undergraduate diploma, which he had obtained in 1991. This is a critical decision because under Turkish law, a presidential candidate must hold a university degree.

The university revoked the diplomas of İmamoğlu and 27 other individuals who had transferred from Girne American University in Northern Cyprus to İstanbul University in the same period. The justification was that Girne American University was not recognized by Turkey’s Higher Education Council (YÖK) at that time, rendering the transfers invalid.

İmamoğlu’s lawyers challenged the decision, arguing that the authority to annul diplomas lies with the faculty board, not the university’s administration. They claim the decision is illegal and politically motivated.

Beyond the diploma issue, if İmamoğlu is convicted of any charges he currently faces, he would also be barred from running.

Additionally, while the next presidential election is scheduled for 2028, parliament has the authority to call an early election.

Meanwhile, Erdoğan and  Bahçeli have been pushing for a new constitution, which could reshape electoral conditions. All in all, there are too many variables right now to predict İmamoğlu’s political future.

How has the government’s municipal takeover policy expanded to CHP?

The practice of government-appointed trustees taking over municipalities became widespread after the failed 2016 coup attempt. During the post-coup state of emergency, the government seized almost all municipalities held by the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP).

Although HDP won back many municipalities in the 2019 local elections, the government again seized most of them, appointing trustees in 59 out of 65 municipalities. In the 2024 elections, HDP’s successor, the DEM Party, regained 75 municipalities, including 11 provinces. However, since the election, seven out of these 11 cities have been taken over by the government while most of the district and town municipalities are still under the DEM’s control.

Until recently, the trustee policy mainly targeted pro-Kurdish parties. However, following CHP’s victory in the 2024 local elections, where Erdoğan’s AKP suffered its most significant electoral loss, the policy expanded to the main opposition party. CHP won the popular vote, surpassed AKP in total municipalities, and secured control of 35 out of 81 provincial municipalities, including 14 major metropolitan areas, gaining a majority of the population and economic power in local governance.

Following the elections, CHP began to face legal challenges similar to those previously used against pro-Kurdish municipalities. In November, İstanbul’s Esenyurt district, the city’s most populous, was taken over after its mayor was arrested in a terrorism investigation. In the same month a trustee was appointed in the Ovacık district of Dersim, a city with a large Kurdish population.

In January, İstanbul’s Beşiktaş district, a key CHP stronghold, was seized by the government over corruption allegations.

Now, with İmamoğlu facing terror-related charges, the central government could take over İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality itself, marking the most significant municipal takeover yet.

Will the crackdown affect Kurdish peace talks?

The timing of the investigations into İmamoğlu and DEM municipalities has raised questions about the government’s ongoing Kurdish initiative. While the main opposition party officials are being investigated over alleged ties to Kurdish militants, the ruling bloc is simultaneously engaging in talks for a new reslution process to the Kurdish question.

The new initiative was launched by Bahçeli in October, when he suggested that Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the PKK, could benefit from “right to hope” if he called on the PKK to disband. After a series of meetings with DEM officials, Öcalan made this call on Feb 27. The Kurdish militant group is now waiting for the government to grant Öcalan “right to hope,” to take steps for disarmament. Meanwhile, discussions continue about the integration of Syria’s Kurdish-led administration, which Turkey views as an extension of the PKK, into the Syrian state.

With these complex political maneuvers unfolding, Kurdish politicians have condemned İmamoğlu’s detention on terror charges. Tuncer Bakırhan, co-leader of DEM, suggested that if İmamoğlu is prosecuted for his negotiations with the Peoples’ Democratic Congress (HDK), then the ruling parties could also be prosecutoed over their meetings with DEM officials.

Meral Danış-Beştaş, co-spokesperson of the HDK, told bianet yesterday, “Nowhere in the world is electoral cooperation between political parties considered a crime. Neither Turkish penal law nor international law recognizes such a charge. These so-called ‘urban cooperation’ operations are just a pretext to justify the investigation. They are effectively saying, ‘any means to an end is justified.’”

She also criticized the criminalization of HDK, saying, “The HDK’s activities, its members, and its co-spokespersons are all public knowledge. You can call us on the phone; we are not living underground. Our identities, addresses, and locations are all known. The fact that they are targeting such a transparent organization suggests they have no other arguments left. Every institution has already been brought into investigation files, and now it’s the HDK’s turn. Yet, there isn’t a single claim that the HDK has committed a crime.” (VK)